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Equally Recognized? The Indigenous
Peoples of Newfoundland and Labrador
SÉBASTIEN GRAMMOND*
In Canada, certain Indigenous groups are struggling to obtain official recognition of
their status and rights. This is particularly so in Newfoundland and Labrador, where the
authorities took the stance, when the province joined Canada in 1949, that no one would
be legally considered Indigenous. This paper analyzes the claims of the Indigenous groups
of that province, which have resulted, over the last thirty years, in various forms of official
recognition.
In particular, this article highlights how the concept of equality was used by these Indigenous
groups to buttress their claims. Equality, in this context, was mainly conceived of as
“sameness in difference”—that is, the idea that an unrecognized group claims to be treated
consistently with other groups that share the same culture or identity and that are already
officially recognized. Such assertions may be made in the context of human rights litigation,
but also through joining or leaving associations of Indigenous groups. Through the latter
process, unrecognized Indigenous groups of the province indicated to whom they wished to
be compared and, in doing so, they ironically reinforced the hierarchy of statuses recognized
under Canadian law.
Au Canada, certains groupes autochtones luttent pour obtenir la reconnaissance officielle de
leur statut et de leurs droits. C’est tout particulièrement le cas à Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador,
où les autorités ont décrété, lorsque la province s’est jointe au Canada en 1949, que personne
ne devait légalement être considéré comme Autochtone. Cet article analyse les revendications des groupes autochtones de cette province qui ont donné lieu, au cours des trente
dernières années, à diverses formes de reconnaissance officielle.
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Cet article souligne plus particulièrement la façon dont ces groupes autochtones ont
employé le concept d’égalité pour étayer leurs revendications. Dans ce contexte, l’égalité
était principalement perçue comme « l’équivalence dans la différence », c’est-à-dire l’idée
qu’un groupe non reconnu revendique d’être traité comme d’autres groupes déjà reconnus
officiellement qui partagent la même culture ou identité. Un groupe peut faire de telles
affirmations dans le cadre de litiges en matière de droits de la personne, mais également
au moment d’adhérer à des associations de groupes autochtones ou de les quitter. Par cette
dernière méthode, les groupes autochtones non reconnus de la province ont indiqué à qui ils
désiraient être comparés et ils ont ainsi paradoxalement renforcé la hiérarchie des statuts
reconnus en vertu du droit canadien.
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SECTION 35(2) OF THE Constitution Act, 19821 states that the “aboriginal

peoples of Canada,” whose Aboriginal and treaty rights are recognized, include
“the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.” In this regard, the province
of Newfoundland and Labrador is remarkable because in 1982, none of its
Indigenous peoples had any form of legal recognition, while today groups in
the province have gained official recognition under each of the three categories.
Recognition, in this context, means the ascription of a separate legal status based
on ethnic identity by a branch of the state (i.e., Parliament, the executive, or
the judiciary), usually triggering specific rights applicable only to the members
of the group so recognized. Since 1982, the federal government has signed a
treaty with the Labrador Inuit Association, created bands and reserves for two
Innu communities in Labrador (as well as for the Miawpukek band), and created
the “landless” Qalipu band encompassing all Mi’kmaw people (other than the
Miawpukek members) on the Island. Meanwhile, the claims of the Labrador
Métis Nation have been partially validated by the courts.
The aim of this paper is to trace the use of the concept of equality in
the discourse concerning the recognition of Newfoundland and Labrador’s
Indigenous peoples. It may seem counterintuitive to speak of equality as the
basis for the separate legal and political treatment of the Indigenous peoples, as
1.

Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982].
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the idea of equality—at least in its formal sense—suggests that the same rules
must be applied to everyone. Thus, the specific rights of Indigenous peoples have
often been contrasted to the universal ideals that undergird the right to equality.2
And indeed, it was in the name of equality that no special status was afforded
to the Indigenous peoples of Newfoundland upon union with Canada in 1949.
Yet, richer conceptions of equality require that a different treatment be offered
to individuals or groups who find themselves in a disadvantaged position.3
Substantive equality then becomes a claim for the recognition of difference rather
than a claim for consistent treatment.4 Such a conception of equality has often
been mentioned as one possible justification for the specific rights granted to the
Indigenous peoples.5
Given the federal and provincial governments’ initial refusal to recognize the
existence of Indigenous groups in the province, Newfoundland and Labrador
provides a unique and novel case study of a framework for the recognition of
Indigenous groups in an era when equality has become a cardinal legal and
political value. To be sure, we do not assume that the motivation of the federal
government (or any other actor) was to achieve greater equality. Nevertheless,
as this article will demonstrate, equality played a central role in the justification
of claims for recognition. Arguably, government responses to such claims were
also informed by equality-related considerations, at least to the extent that the
government must publicly justify its policies such that it does not appear as if
similar groups are treated differently, and to the extent that it faces the prospect
of court rulings invalidating laws or policies that are contrary to the right to
equality. Thus, equality is at once a powerful tool and a powerful constraint. Yet,
when we look today at the (almost) final result of these struggles for recognition,
we do not find a single set of rules equally applicable to all Indigenous persons in
the province, but rather a patchwork of statuses and bundles of rights that differ
from group to group. I will argue that this inconsistent treatment is the result of
a combination of assertions of sameness and difference by the groups concerned
and of the practical way these assertions played out in the political arena.

2.
3.
4.

5.

See e.g. R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at para 18, 137 DLR (4th) 289 [Van der Peet].
For a general survey, see William B Griffiths, “Equality and Egalitarianism: Framing the
Contemporary Debate” (1994) 7 Can JL & Jur 5.
See Michel Rosenfeld, “Equality and the Dialectic between Identity and Difference” in
Omid Payrow Shabani, ed, Multiculturalism and Law: A Critical Debate (Cardiff: University
of Wales Press, 2007) 156. See also Danièle Lochak, Le droit et les paradoxes de l’universalité
(Paris: PUF, 2010).
See e.g. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995); Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution
of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
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In Part I of this article, I explain how unrecognized Indigenous peoples can
use the right to equality, in its substantive conception, to articulate their claims
for recognition as claims for “sameness in difference.” In Part II, I describe the
Indigenous groups of Newfoundland and Labrador and indicate how, in the years
after Confederation, formal equality was used to justify their non-recognition. In
Part III, I analyze how these groups used the concept of equality to support their
respective struggles for recognition. Those claims were often based on “sameness in
difference” and led each group to compare itself to other, already recognized groups.

I. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND EQUALITY CLAIMS
Explaining this complex outcome requires a deeper understanding of certain
aspects of the right to equality and of the manner in which it can be applied to
the claims of ethnic groups such as Indigenous peoples. In particular, we must
pay attention to how the concepts of comparison, sameness, and difference play
out in each case.
The liberal argument for cultural rights based on substantive equality is
grounded in the idea that the state must respond positively to cultural differences
where the failure to do so would actually put members of a cultural minority at
a disadvantage.6 Thus, an assertion of difference grounds specific rights aimed at
enabling members of the group to live according to their culture and to perpetuate
that culture. However, assertions of sameness may also ground claims to cultural
rights in a situation where such rights are already recognized for some individuals,
but denied to others who share the same culture. For example, Indigenous women
who, in a number of famous cases, claimed that they were unjustly deprived of
Indian status were, in a sense, asserting their sameness to Indigenous men who
kept their status in similar circumstances.7 In other words, these women were
in the same situation as those whose difference already translated into specific
6.

7.

For an application of this idea to the context of language rights, see Arsenault-Cameron v
Prince Edward Island, 2000 SCC 1 at para 31, [2000] 1 SCR 3; Gosselin v Quebec (AG),
2002 SCC 84 at paras 15, 21, [2002] 4 SCR 429. See also Eldridge v British Columbia (AG),
[1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 DLR (4th) 577 (providing an analogy in a different context, where
the failure to provide sign-language translation to deaf persons was considered to be a breach
of equality).
See e.g. Canada (AG) v Lavell, [1974] SCR 1349, 38 DLR (3d) 481; Lovelace v Canada,
UNHRC, 1981, Supp. No. 40, UN Doc A/36/40, 116; McIvor v Canada (Registrar, Indian
and Northern Affairs), 2009 BCCA 153, 306 DLR (4th) 193. For an analysis of these cases,
see Sébastien Grammond, Identity Captured by Law: Membership in Canada’s Indigenous
Peoples and Linguistic Minorities (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009) at 91-99
[Grammond, Identity Captured by Law]; Sébastien Grammond, “Discrimination in the Rules
of Indian Status and the McIvor case” (2009) 35:1 Queen’s LJ 421.
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rights. For that reason, we will refer to this sort of claim as one of “sameness
in difference.” This category of claim assumes that a particular kind of cultural
difference has already been validated by the state as a source of specific rights. As
such, the claimants assert that the definition given by the state to the category
of persons who may benefit from those rights is under-inclusive, as it excludes
persons (such as the claimants) who share the same cultural difference (hence,
“sameness in difference”) as the persons who are included.
The same distinction also applies when claims are made collectively (by
which I mean that what is sought is a collective right or a right that can only be
enjoyed collectively). For example, a minority group may say that specific rights
are necessary for its cultural survival. Professor Magnet, for one, has elaborated a
theory of equality between groups that ensures cultural minorities have the same
opportunities to enjoy and perpetuate their cultures as the majority group. As he
puts it: “A group is equal to other relevant groups when it possesses adequate means
of perpetuation.”8 This theory is aimed at maintaining the minority’s difference or
specificity and is not inherently based on a comparison with other groups.
But again, a minority group might base a claim on “sameness in difference”—
that is, it could challenge its exclusion from rights or benefits granted to another
minority group that shares the same (or a similar) culture. For example, in
Ardoch Algonquin First Nation v Canada,9 a number of non-status Indigenous
groups successfully asserted that they should have the same opportunity as
First Nations groups to conclude agreements for the management of workforce
training programs aimed at their constituencies. The plaintiffs did not so much
argue that the management of a workforce training program was essential to the
maintenance of their culture; rather, they asserted that since the program was
aimed at the Indigenous population generally, and the government had seen fit
to delegate its management to First Nations, it should extend the same treatment
to non-status groups.
Of course, the application of these concepts to practical situations depends
on factual judgments about which cultural differences require specific rights
for their maintenance, or which similarities call for similar treatment. Culture,
ethnicity, and identity are not easily measurable nor compared. The difficulty
8.

9.

Joseph Eliot Magnet, Modern Constitutionalism: Identity, Equality, and Democracy (Markham,
Ont: LexisNexis, 2004) at 237. See also Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 16.1, Part
I of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1. This section refers to the equality of the French
and English linguistic communities in New Brunswick.
2003 FCA 473, [2004] 2 FCR 108 [Ardoch]. See also Sébastien Grammond, “Equality
Between Indigenous Groups” (2009) 45 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 91 [Grammond, “Equality”].
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in identifying the differences that call for specific treatment is illustrated by
the process by which the courts select the “analogous grounds” that attract the
protection of the right to equality. Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms10 prohibits discrimination not only on the basis of the grounds
enumerated therein, but also on “analogous” grounds identified by the courts.11
This process relies heavily on existing social categories, identity groups, and patterns
of discrimination and prejudice. For example, with respect to sexual orientation,
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has noted that this characteristic is
profoundly related to individual identity and cannot easily be changed.12 One
can appreciate, however, that such a conclusion depends on the knowledge and
social representations of the judges about homosexuality and its link to personal
identity. Hence, the practical application of the right to equality may very well
depend on dominant social perceptions or representations of the situation or
identity of disadvantaged groups. Thus, sameness and difference with respect to
cultural groups may be difficult for the judiciary or others to assess.
An additional difficulty arises when a group seeks specific rights on the basis
of the right to equality as the recognition of its difference. Deciding what bundle
of specific rights is necessary for the preservation of a group’s culture involves not
only a measurement of the group’s cultural specificity, but also practical judgments
as to the contribution of certain rights or policies to the preservation of that
specificity, as well as a cost-benefit analysis of those rights or policies. This task
is all the more difficult in the case of unrecognized Indigenous groups, as their
cultural difference has generally been denied for a long period by the government,
by non-Indigenous society, and often by recognized Indigenous groups. Those
difficulties, however, are not present when their claims are framed in terms of
“sameness in difference.” In these cases, the courts are not called upon to craft
new measures intended to protect a group’s culture, but rather to decide whether
existing measures in favour of one group should be extended to another group
that is culturally similar. Such a judgment may more easily be made intuitively or
on the basis of a superficial analysis of each group’s cultural traits.
As a result, we may hypothesize that Indigenous groups seeking recognition
will be more successful if they frame their claims in terms of “sameness in
difference.” In other words, claimants will liken their situation to that of other
Indigenous groups whose status and rights are already recognized. A side effect of
10. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1.
11. See Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1; Corbiere
v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR 203 at para 13, 173 DLR
(4th) 1.
12. See ibid; Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493 at para 90, 156 DLR (4th) 385.
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this tendency is to bring back the search for comparator groups at the forefront
of equality analysis, even though the SCC has tried to downplay the importance
of comparison in such cases, given the obstructive effects it has on many kinds
of claims (in particular where no useful comparison may be drawn or where a
comparison fails to capture the essence of the disadvantage that flows from a
distinction13).
Studying the struggle of the Indigenous peoples of Newfoundland and
Labrador bears out this hypothesis. The starting point of that struggle is the
official classification of the Indigenous peoples that derives from legislation
and government policy. This classification usually reflects the views and the
goals of government officials and non-Indigenous society in general; yet, it
is constantly challenged by the claims of groups that are excluded from it. In
making such challenges, these groups liken their circumstances to that of groups
that are already recognized—they want to be treated equally with them. Sadly,
these groups also stress their differences with other unrecognized groups, in an
attempt to portray themselves as more deserving of recognition than others.
Over the last forty years, the response of the federal government to the claims of
unrecognized groups has had the effect of making the official classification more
complex. In blunt terms, new categories were created for groups who were seen
as “less Indigenous” according to the stereotypes of the non-Indigenous society,
attracting a narrower bundle of rights than groups with Indian status.14 The result
is effectively a hierarchy of Indigenous peoples or a ladder of statuses. When a
group seeks recognition by invoking the right to equality, it is trying to climb this
ladder as much as it can. This has been done by delicately deploying sameness and
difference in establishing positive and negative comparisons to other groups and
by showing to outsiders features usually associated with recognized Indigenous
groups. Thus, while equality was a driving force in the developments of the last
thirty years, the end result might very well be a patchwork of Indigenous groups.
Whether that outcome reflects the actual needs and circumstances of the groups
concerned or the views and prejudices of dominant society is a difficult question
that cannot be fully addressed in the context of this paper.
In the following pages, I will analyze the successive use of formal and
substantive conceptions of equality to justify the non-recognition and, later,
the recognition of Newfoundland and Labrador’s Indigenous peoples. For each
group that sought recognition, I will show how its discourse and actions invited
13. Withler v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 12 at paras 55-63, [2011] 1 SCR 396 [Withler].
14. See Part III of this paper for additional detail on this reality.
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comparisons with certain groups and avoided comparisons with others. The
focus will not be so much on court decisions—for most lawsuits were settled—
but on the arguments made in various legal fora as well as the reconfiguration of
political organizations that reflected the struggles for recognition. Indeed, joining
a political organization or breaking away from one are powerful ways of asserting
one’s views on the proper terms of comparison under an equality analysis. In that
sense, the need to build a legal case has an impact on the manner in which the
Indigenous peoples build their political organization. At the same time, the legal
categories are transformed and complicated by the struggle for recognition and
the negotiated solutions reached with various groups.

II. ASSIMILATION AND EQUALITY
Before Newfoundland joined Confederation in 1949, the official classification
of the Indigenous peoples was based on the “Indian/white” dichotomy.15 The
Indian Act categorized, through the use of criteria based on ancestry, a number
of persons as being “Indian,” and those who were not “Indians” were defined as
being “persons.”16 The assumption behind the classification was that “Indians”
were uncivilized, and the goal—as exemplified through the statutory mechanism
of enfranchisement—was to cause an increasing number of Indians to lose that
characterization or, to use racial terms, to become “white.” The label of “Indian”
was clearly seen as a badge of inferiority.
With a few exceptions, the scheme of the Indian Act did not allow for
intermediate categories; the Act did not grant rights to non-status Indian groups.
Thus, the Métis who accepted scrip17 would not be considered status Indians,
but white persons who did not need the protection of the Indian Act. The
notable anomaly in this binary distinction was the Inuit, who were recognized as
“Indians” under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867,18 even though the
federal government refused to bring them within the purview of the Indian Act.19
Hence, Newfoundland joined Canada in a context that did not favour the
creation of specific categories of Indigenous peoples and where the existence of a
specific legal regime for the Indigenous peoples was viewed as temporary.
15. See also Grammond, Identity Captured by Law, supra note 7.
16. For the definition of “person,” see Indian Act, SC 1876, c 18, s 3(12) [Indian Act].
17. “Scrip” is the expression commonly used to refer to the individual land grants made to the
Métis. See Manitoba Act, 1870, SC 1870, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 8, s 31.
18. (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
19. Re Eskimos, [1939] SCR 104, 2 DLR 417 [Re Eskimos]. See also Constance Backhouse,
Colour-Coded: a Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900-1950 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1999) at 39-52.
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A. INDIGENOUS NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR AND COLONIZATION

It is generally accepted that prior to European colonization, Newfoundland was
inhabited by an Indigenous people called the Beothuk. Labrador, on its part,
was inhabited by the Inuit, mainly on the coast, and by the Innu, who occupied
mostly the interior.
What remains a matter of debate are the circumstances of the arrival of the
Mi’kmaq in Newfoundland. The Mi’kmaq assert that they were able to cross
Cabot Strait from today’s Nova Scotia and to establish themselves in southern
Newfoundland before the establishment of a firm European presence.20 Others
contend that the Mi’kmaq were brought to the Island by the French, who
maintained fishing posts on the Island until the eighteenth century and who
needed allies to fight the Beothuk.21
Colonization of Newfoundland and Labrador was relatively slow. Fishing
remained the most important economic activity for a long time; it did not require
the extensive use of land, so the population of European origin remained concentrated on the coasts. Yet, as the British presence developed, violent conflict with
the Beothuk increased. Most historians recognize that as a result of these conflicts
and other factors, including the spread of disease, the Beothuk became extinct in
the early nineteenth century.22 The characterization of those events remains highly
controversial: some historians go as far as to speak of extermination23 or “an open
hunting season against the Beothuk,”24 whereas others simply note in passing
the conflict between colonists and the Beothuk and its tragic end.25 It may well
20. See Maura Hanrahan, The Lasting Breach: The Omission of Aboriginal People from the Terms
of Union Between Newfoundland and Canada and its Ongoing Impacts, online: Government
of Newfoundland and Labrador <http://www.gov.nl.ca/publicat/royalcomm/research/
Hanrahan.pdf>. See also Bonita Lawrence, “Reclaiming Ktaqamkuk: Land and Mi’kmaq
Identity in Newfoundland” in Julian Agyeman, ed, Speaking For Ourselves: Environmental
Justice in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009) 42 at 47.
21. See e.g. Sean T Cadigan, Newfoundland and Labrador: A History (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2009) at 53 (stating that the Mi’kmaq may have visited Newfoundland as
early as the 16th century, but emphasizing that the French incited more Mi’kmaq to settle on
the southern coast of the Island).
22. See generally LFS Upton, “The Extermination of the Beothuks of Newfoundland” (1977)
58:2 Can Hist Rev 133; Olive P Dickason, Canada’s First Nations: A History of Founding
Peoples from Earliest Times, 4th ed (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2009); Cadigan, supra
note 21.
23. See Upton, supra note 22.
24. Dickason, supra note 22 at 71.
25. Cadigan, supra note 21 at 53-54, 86-87, 93-95.
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be that some Beothuk actually joined other Indigenous groups, although this is
difficult to trace precisely.
Prior to Confederation, Newfoundland did not have a well-defined policy
towards its Indigenous peoples.26 It did not have a comprehensive statutory
scheme similar to the Canadian Indian Act. It did not operate a system of reserves,
although the establishment of a reserve for the Mi’kmaq of Conne River was
contemplated towards the end of the nineteenth century.27 Most importantly,
it did not have rules concerning Indian status, which would legally ascribe an
Indigenous identity to a part of its population.
The ethnic identity of the Indigenous peoples of Newfoundland and
Labrador was not static and the ways in which some of those groups conceived
of their identity, or represented it to outsiders, shifted over time. These changes
were the result of phenomena such as mixed unions, assimilative pressures, and
stigmatization of the Indigenous peoples on the part of Euro-Canadians.28
As a result of these factors, Mi’kmaq identity became less visible on the Island.
It appears that the Mi’kmaq intermarried in large numbers with non-Indigenous
Newfoundlanders. Mi’kmaq identity was not always transmitted to the children
of such unions, as Indigenous ancestry was often a source of shame (the term
“jackatar” was used pejoratively to describe persons with Indigenous ancestry29).
Dennis Bartels and Alice Bartels give examples of persons who have Mi’kmaq
ancestry but were not told about it in their childhood and who only recently
decided to emphasize that aspect of their identity.30 As descendants of these
unions integrated into mainstream society, distinctive cultural practices were
not always retained and homogeneous and isolated Indigenous communities
were no longer the norm. Yet, some communities remained ostensibly Mi’kmaq.
Conne River was one of those, but some observers note that other communities
26. See Adrian Tanner, “The Aboriginal Peoples of Newfoundland and Labrador and
Confederation” (1998) 14:2 Nfld Stud 238 at 241-44; David Mackenzie, “The Indian Act
and the Aboriginal Peoples of Newfoundland at the Time of Confederation” (2010) 25:2
Nfld and Lab Stud 161 at 163.
27. See Hanrahan, supra note 20 at 235.
28. See John C Kennedy, “Labrador Metis Ethnogenesis” (1997) 62:3&4 Ethnos 5 [Kennedy,
“Labrador Metis”].
29. Tanner, supra note 26 at 242.
30. “Mi’gmaq Lives: Aboriginal Identity in Newfoundland” in Ute Lischke & David T McNab,
eds, Walking a Tightrope: Aboriginal People and Their Representations (Waterloo: Wilfrid
Laurier University Press, 2005) 249. Regarding the current revival of Mi’kmaw culture, see
Angela Robinson, “‘Being and Becoming Indian’: Mi’kmaw Cultural Revival in the Western
Newfoundland Region” (2012) 32:1 Can J Native Stud 1.
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such as Flat Bay, Badger, St. Georges or Glenwood had an important Mi’kmaq
population and were always considered Mi’kmaq communities.31
In northern Labrador, beginning in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth
century, marital unions between Indigenous (mainly Inuit) women and men who
settled on the coast to take part in fishing and trading gave rise to a population of
mixed ancestry that became distinct from the Inuit, yet developed a culture that
drew upon both Indigenous and European traits.32 These people were called the
“Settlers” or, in Inuktitut, Kablunangajuit.33 The Settlers were initially mocked by
the Inuit. The Moravian missionaries who established stations on the Labrador
coast tried to keep the Settlers and the Inuit separate, which contributed to the
rise of a specific ethnic consciousness on the part of the Settlers.
A similar phenomenon took place in southern Labrador as well.34 However,
the less structured administration of that part of the territory resulted in greater
assimilation to European culture, including a much less frequent use of the
Inuktitut language. Moreover, stigmatization of Indigenous identity led many
people to hide their ancestry, although Indigenous persons knew that they
were different from their non-Indigenous neighbours.35 According to John C.
Kennedy, “Group consciousness was tacit, loosely bounded, not reinforced by
social or administrative institutions, and not mobilized around the obvious
criteria usually epitomizing a group or nation, such as for example, language, or
even group name.”36
B. CONFEDERATION (1949) AND ITS AFTERMATH

As is well known, Newfoundland joined Canada in 1949, becoming its tenth
province. During the negotiations concerning the terms of union, the federal
and Newfoundland governments discussed matters concerning the Indigenous
31. Tanner, supra note 26 at 243-44; Lawrence, supra note 20 at 57; Jerry Wetzel, “Liberal
Theory as a Tool of Colonialism and the Forced Assimilation of the First Nations of
Newfoundland and Labrador” (1995) 4 Dal J Of Legal Stud 105 at 142-43.
32. See Kennedy, “Labrador Metis,” supra note 28 at 8 (who mentions that many Settlers spoke
Inuktitut and learned “complicated techniques of survival on the land and sea,” while
adhering to “European notions of individual accumulation, hard work, and race”).
33. With respect to the various names employed to describe this population, see Yves Labrèche
and John C Kennedy, “Héritage culturel des Métis du Labrador central” (2007) 37:2&3
Recherches amérindiennes au Québec 43.
34. See ibid; Kennedy, “Labrador Metis,” supra note 28 at 11-13; Paul Charest, “La spécificité
culturelle des communautés métisses du Labrador méridional” in Denis Gagnon & Hélène
Giguère, eds, L’identité métisse en question: stratégies identitaires et dynamismes culturels
(Quebec City: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2012) 99.
35. See ibid.
36. Kennedy, “Labrador Metis,” supra note 28 at 13.
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peoples. While both governments initially thought the Indian Act would apply in
the new province,37 entailing the creation of reserves and bands and the registration
of Indians, they later changed their minds and decided, provisionally at least, to
treat Indigenous Newfoundlanders no differently than other citizens.
This decision must be set against the background of the Canadian policies of
the time. In 1949, the Indian Act was in a process of revision. The distinctive legal
treatment of the Indigenous peoples was seen as a temporary measure that would
prepare them for their assimilation into mainstream Canadian society (i.e., their
becoming “full citizens”). The new Indian Act,38 adopted in 1951, promoted
enfranchisement—that is, the loss of Indian status of those who had attained a
certain “degree of civilization.”39 Through section 88, the new Indian Act would
also pave the way for the application of provincial legislation and services to the
Indigenous peoples. The reluctance to extend the reach of the Indian Act was also
evident in the Canadian government’s refusal to apply it to the Inuit, despite an
SCC decision holding that they fell under federal jurisdiction.40 Moreover, in the
years following World War II there was a greater awareness of human rights, and
the separate legal treatment of Indigenous peoples, which resulted (among other
things) in their inability to vote, was seen by many as a form of racial discrimination.
In that context, Canadian officials gradually realized that extending the
Indian Act to the Indigenous peoples of Newfoundland would deprive the latter
of certain rights, most importantly the right to vote.41 This argument eventually
convinced most participants in the negotiations that it would be better to leave the
administration of Indigenous affairs to the new province. Other arguments were
also mentioned, such as the difficulty of creating reserves in the new province.42
In truth, however, the issue was not at the forefront of the union discussions and
the decision not to apply the Indian Act in Newfoundland appears to have been
more the result of inertia and lack of interest than that of any principled analysis.
Moreover, Canadian officials doubted the authenticity of the Indigenous
identity of the Mi’kmaq of Newfoundland. For example, an official sent on
a fact-finding mission in 1948 reported that Newfoundland’s Indigenous

37.
38.
39.
40.

See Mackenzie, supra note 26 at 166; Tanner, supra note 26 at 244-45.
RSC 1985, c I-5.
Indian Act, supra note 16, s 86.
Re Eskimos, supra note 19. See also Grammond, Identity Captured by Law, supra note 7 at
82-84.
41. Mackenzie, supra note 26; Tanner, supra note 26 at 245-46. See also Wetzel, supra note 31 at
132-33.
42. See Tanner, supra note 26 at 248-49; Mackenzie, supra note 26 at 171.
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population was wholly located in Labrador.43 Later documents of the Department
of Indian Affairs show that it was believed that the Mi’kmaq had become “merged
with other citizens.”44
After Confederation, the federal government took some years to even
acknowledge that it bore some responsibility for the Indigenous peoples of
Newfoundland. After initial public denials of responsibility and internal debates
as to its jurisdiction, the federal government concluded funding agreements
with the province to cover the costs of providing services to the Indigenous
population: first in 1954, and then in 1965 (with respect to a broader range of
services).45 One original feature of these agreements was that they did not focus
on services provided to individuals holding Indian status, but provided benefits
to all residents of certain “designated communities,” which were generally
regarded as being mostly Indigenous.46 Initially, the designated communities
were all in northern Labrador, but Conne River was added in 1973, at the
behest of the Native Association of Newfoundland and Labrador.47 Even though
these agreements were based on the Indigenous character of the designated
communities and the federal government’s jurisdiction over the Indigenous
peoples, they used geographical criteria that avoided the identification of specific
individuals as being Indigenous or not.
Yet, other forms of inequality continued to haunt federal officials. In memos
written in the 1960s, Department of Justice officials underscored that the
Indigenous peoples of the province were deprived of the benefits offered to their
counterparts elsewhere in Canada. The argument that the Indigenous peoples
of Newfoundland had the “benefit” of enfranchisement was countered with
the argument that they were never given the choice to enfranchise or to retain

43. See Mackenzie, supra note 26 at 170.
44. Wetzel, supra note 31 at 133 (citing a memorandum dated 25 October 1949 by HL
Keenlyside). See also Tanner, supra note 26 at 243.
45. See Tanner, supra note 26 at 247; Donald M McRae, Report on the Complaints of the Innu of
Labrador (Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Commission, 1993) at 7-8. See also Anderson v
Canada (AG) (2013), 335 Nfld & PEIR 46, 1040 APR 46 (CA) (where the history of those
agreements is reviewed).
46. Bill Rompkey, The Story of Labrador (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003) at
101ff; Evie Plaice, “The Lie of the Land: Identity Politics and the Canadian Land Claims
Process in Labrador” in Derick Fay & Deborah James, eds, The Rights and Wrongs of Land
Restitution (New York: Routledge, 2009) 67 at 71.
47. Tanner, supra note 26 at 247; John C Kennedy, “Aboriginal Organizations and Their Claims:
The Case of Newfoundland and Labrador” (1987) 19:2 Can Ethnic Stud 13 at 15 [Kennedy,
“Aboriginal Organizations”].
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Indian status, contrary to the practice in other parts of the country.48 Thus, the
attempt to invoke formal equality to justify the non-recognition of Indigenous
identity in Newfoundland became less convincing to those who realized that
various comparisons could be drawn with other Indigenous peoples and that
some of these comparisons would support the granting of status to the province’s
Indigenous population. Formal equality led to the suppression of difference,
whereas the people concerned wanted to retain and assert their difference and
had never been consulted on the subject.

III. RECOGNITION AND EQUALITY
With the resurgence of Indigenous activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the formal equality paradigm that underpinned the refusal to grant a specific
legal status to the Indigenous peoples of Newfoundland and Labrador became
increasingly untenable. It became obvious that the Indigenous peoples of that
province had not become assimilated. Equality came to be invoked in support of
claims for recognition.
The strategies that they deployed to gain recognition made explicit use of the
legal concept of equality. Beyond that, they also sought to position themselves as
being the equals of other Indigenous groups and did so by inviting comparisons
between these groups and themselves—thus asserting their “sameness in
difference.” But some groups of the province also sought to distance themselves
from other groups that were perceived as less Indigenous in order to increase
their chances of obtaining recognition. In so doing, they were trying to fit within
the classification or hierarchy of Indigenous groups that stemmed from federal
policies,49 and they were indicating to whom they wanted to be compared.
During the relevant period, that classification became more complex than the
Indian/non-Indian binary distinction that underpins the Indian Act. Of course,
First Nations composed of status Indians residing on reserves remain at the top of
the classification. Yet, as more and more status Indians move outside the reserves
to live in an urban or rural setting, federal policies and legislation operate in a
way that affords much-diminished funding and rights to off-reserve Indians, thus
creating a divide within the category of “Indian” itself.50 Nationally, on-reserve
48. Wetzel, supra note 31 at 141 (quoting a Cabinet Memorandum dated 22 April 1965).
49. For a detailed discussion of the emergence of that classification, see Grammond, “Equality,”
supra note 9.
50. For example, off-reserve Indians usually do not benefit from a tax exemption and several
federal funding programs (e.g., housing) are limited to reserves.
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status Indians are represented by the Assembly of First Nations (AFN). The next
category is that of “Inuit.” While the Inuit have never been brought under the
Indian Act for historical reasons, most federal policies treat them equally to status
Indians and grant them similar benefits, with some notable exceptions such as
the tax exemption.51 This similarity of treatment, combined with the geographical isolation of most Inuit, produces a popular representation of that category
that carries the same level of indigeneity and authenticity as for status Indians.
Nationally, the Inuit are represented by the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC), now
called Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK).
In an attempt to manage the increasing attractiveness of indigeneity and
the growing number of groups who sought recognition, the federal government
constructed a “non-status” Indigenous population and dealt with it through
channels separate from the Indian Affairs bureaucracy.52 While it is by no means
homogeneous, this third category comprises persons who are neither status
Indians nor Inuit and who chose to identify with such labels as Métis, non-status
Indians or Aboriginals. The federal government’s refusal to consider that this
category of persons falls under its jurisdiction places those in this category at a
serious disadvantage compared to status Indians and Inuit, as most programs
offered to the latter are unavailable to these groups.53 Yet, the federal government
has provided funding to associations that represent this category of persons, and
certain programs are made available to all Indigenous persons irrespective of
Indian status.54 The selection of the groups to whom such funding is offered has
had a significant influence on the structuring of Indigenous identity.55 Thus, the
government recognizes one national association—the Métis National Council
(MNC)—and one association in each of the Western provinces and Ontario
representing the Métis Nation.56 In addition, the government funds one national
51. Indian Act, supra note 16, s 87. For a detailed discussion, see Sébastien Grammond, Terms of
Coexistence: Indigenous Peoples and Canadian Law (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at 496-511.
52. See generally Daniels v Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2013
FC 6 at paras 84-110, 357 DLR (4th) 47 (for information about federal policy in respect of
Indian affairs).
53. This refusal was challenged with success. See ibid (holding that Métis and non-status Indians
fall under federal jurisdiction). The case was heard by the Federal Court of Appeal in October
2013. Daniels was partially upheld on appeal: 2014 FCA 101.
54. See e.g. Ardoch, supra note 9 (with respect to a government-funded human resource training
program).
55. See Larry Chartrand, “Metis Identity and Citizenship” (2001) 12 Windsor Rev Legal Soc
Issues 5; Joe Sawchuk, “Negotiating an Identity: Métis Political Organizations, the Canadian
Government, and Competing Concepts of Aboriginality” (2001) 25 Am Indian Qrtly 73.
56. Ibid at 77-80.
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association—the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (CAP)—and its provincial
affiliates to represent Aboriginal peoples who are neither status Indians, Inuit, nor
members of the Métis Nation.57 Yet, CAP’s affiliates have membership policies
that exclude a number of persons who assert an Indigenous identity,58 thus
creating a fourth category of Indigenous peoples who are deprived of any official
recognition or rights and whose political organization is limited to self-funded
voluntary associations.
Over the last forty years, the Indigenous groups of Newfoundland and
Labrador have tried to gain recognition not only from governments, but also
from the associations representing the various categories of Indigenous peoples
elsewhere in the country. Recent research has highlighted the significance of
inter-Indigenous recognition in the definition of various forms of Indigenous
status.59 In the case at hand, such recognition allowed certain groups to buttress
their equality claims by inviting a comparison with groups on the upper rungs of
the hierarchy of Indigenous peoples described above. In other words, trying to join
a national association is a form of assertion of identity; it signals who a particular
group considers its equal. However, this form of jockeying has the unfortunate
effect of reinforcing the official categories instead of challenging them.
In the next pages, I describe the legal and political strategies of the Indigenous
groups of the province. For each case, I analyze the implicit or explicit role of the
concept of equality in support of their claims, as well as the ways in which they
indicated the groups to which they wanted to be compared, and the actual results
they obtained. I also highlight how the search for comparators has driven the splits
and mergers among Indigenous political groups and how the groups emphasized
certain forms of difference in support of their quests for recognition. In the end,
we will be in a position to appreciate how the groups’ actions subverted the
federal government’s will to keep as many people as possible in the lower rung of
the classification.
A. THE LABRADOR INUIT ASSOCIATION

As mentioned earlier, northern Labrador was populated by Inuit and Settler groups.
While the two groups remained quite distinct, the “designated communities”60
57. Ibid at 80-82.
58. See e.g. Pamela D Palmater, Beyond Blood: Rethinking Indigenous Identity (Saskatoon:
Purich, 2011) at 198-99; Sébastien Grammond, Isabelle Lantagne & Natacha Gagné, “Aux
marges de la classification officielle: les groupes autochtones sans statut devant les tribunaux
canadiens” (2012) 81 Dr et Soc 321.
59. See Kirsty Gover, Tribal Constitutionalism: States, Tribes, and the Governance of Membership
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
60. See Rompkey, supra note 46 at 101ff; Plaice, supra note 46 at 71.
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system resulted in both groups being eligible for the benefits resulting from
federal-provincial agreements. In the early 1970s, when Indigenous groups
across the country intensified their political organization, the Inuit of northern
Labrador were approached by the ITC, the national Inuit organization, to form a
regional chapter.61 This is how the Labrador Inuit Association (LIA) was created
in 1972-73. Yet, the issue of membership in the LIA sparked a controversy:
Could the Settlers join this organization? Initially, it appears that the ITC was
reluctant to extend LIA membership to the Settlers. However, the LIA eventually
decided to admit the Settlers, likely because of the possibility of increasing its
membership.62 (It may also be that because Settlers were admissible to federallysubsidized programs and services offered to northern Labrador communities,
their claim to join in whatever benefits that the LIA could secure appeared as the
continuation of the former policy of inclusion.63) Thus the northern Labrador
Settlers were successful in associating with the Inuit and in sharing in the capital
of recognition that came with this label, although they might have been labelled
as “Métis” in other circumstances.
The LIA eventually filed a land claim, which was quickly accepted for
negotiation, perhaps because the Indigenous identity of the Inuit and the validity
of their claims are rarely doubted. Despite delays in the negotiation process, the
Labrador Inuit Agreement was concluded in 2005 and provided for the creation
of a regional government, the Nunatsiavut Government, which is controlled by
the Inuit and Settlers.64 The definition of the beneficiaries of the Agreement was
tailored to take into account the two groups comprising the LIA, although there
is a single registry, which means that the two groups are now legally merged.
Geographical isolation may have also played a role in the acceptance of
the Inuit-Settler alliance by the governments. By restricting the area of its land
claim to northern Labrador, the LIA excluded persons of Inuit ancestry living
in central and southern Labrador, whose Indigenous identity had received less
outside recognition and whose claims may have been viewed as more threatening
to military and resource development interests.
Thus, signature of the Agreement consecrated the equal treatment of the Inuit
and Settlers of Labrador, affirming in a sense that there is no natural boundary
61. Kennedy, “Aboriginal Organizations,” supra note 47 at 15-16; Kennedy, “Labrador Metis,”
supra note 28 at 10-11.
62. Plaice, supra note 46 at 72-73.
63. Kennedy, “Labrador Metis,” supra note 28 at 9-10.
64. Intergovernmental and Aboriginal Affairs Secretariat, Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement,
online: Newfoundland and Labrador <http://www.exec.gov.nl.ca/exec/igas/land_claims/
agreement.html>.
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between the two groups, at least with respect to the northern part of Labrador.
The Settlers were successful in their assertion of sameness to the Inuit, although
in the process their difference from the Inuit is legally erased. One should be
aware, however, that had the Settlers chosen to insist on their difference and to
identify as Métis, their aspirations would have met with the federal government’s
refusal to enter into land claims agreements with Métis groups in the provinces.
B. THE ISLAND: MIAWPUKEK

The early 1970s also saw the development of Indigenous political organizations on
the Island of Newfoundland, first through the Native Association of Newfoundland and Labrador (NANL), which, as its name indicated, initially attempted to
cover the whole province. The NANL was founded in 1973, apparently with the
support of the Native Council of Canada (NCC—the predecessor of CAP), the
association that represented non-status and Métis people across Canada.65 Yet,
as we saw above, the federal government currently does not recognize the NCC/
CAP membership as falling under its jurisdiction over “Indians,” even though it
has agreed to fund certain programs for their benefit. Moreover, as we saw above,
the cultural authenticity of Mi’kmaq people on the Island was often doubted
by outsiders. Thus, the NANL initially suffered from a negative perception,
probably reinforced by the decision of the Innu of Labrador to dissociate from it
and to pursue their claims separately.
In order to combat this perception, the NANL changed its name to the
Federation of Newfoundland Indians (FNI) and moved its headquarters to
Conne River, a community whose Indigenous character appeared more obvious
to outsiders, partly because it was inhabited mainly by Mi’kmaq (thus giving
it greater homogeneity than other Mi’kmaq communities on the Island) and
because Newfoundland had considered setting a reserve apart for them in the
nineteenth century. It also sought to join the National Indian Brotherhood (the
predecessor to AFN).66 By these gestures, the FNI clearly showed to whom it
wanted to be compared and what bundle of rights it sought.
Nevertheless, the federal government remained skeptical of the Indigenous
identity of FNI members and demanded genealogical evidence as proof. Conne
River was selected as a pilot project.67 In 1982, realizing that it alone could satisfy
the requirements of the federal government, Conne River announced that it would
withdraw from the FNI, and in doing so expressly cast doubt over the legitimacy
65. Kennedy, “Aboriginal Organizations,” supra note 47 at 15.
66. Ibid at 17.
67. The Mikmaqs of Newfoundland: A Report Prepared for the Canadian Human Rights Commission
(Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Commission, 1997) at 5 [“The Lyon Report”].
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of the identity of other members of the FNI.68 Conne River was constituted as an
Indian band in 1984, changed its name to Miawpukek in 1989,69 and received
a reserve thereafter. As a result, Miawpukek members are individually exempt
from tax on their income earned on the reserve and also benefit collectively from
federal funding associated with the existence of a reserve.
Thus, only after considerably narrowing the category of persons who were
seeking recognition was the federal government willing to treat Conne River
equally to other First Nations in Canada, in effect allowing Miawpukek to join
the uppermost category of Indigenous peoples in the official classification. In
the process, other members of the original class (i.e., those seeking recognition)
were pushed down the ladder and their status likened to those whose identity
is doubtful or contested and who receive fewer rights as a result. And perhaps
the Miawpukek benefited from the presumption, which underpins the federal
funding policy, that there must be some Indian group in each province (in the
sense that no group in the region had a better claim to indigeneity at the time70).
It may also be that the glaring omission to recognize the Indigenous peoples of
the province in 1949 created the impression that a gap needed to be filled.
Yet, Miawpukek members are not treated equally to other First Nations in
Canada in one significant respect: Most First Nations elsewhere in the country
have either Aboriginal or treaty rights or, in some cases, both. However, the
provincial government has challenged Miawpukek’s claim of Aboriginal rights
on the basis that the Mi’kmaq were brought to the Island by the French—in
other words, they were “immigrants.”71 Therefore, they could not establish that
they exercised rights in the province before first contact with the Europeans, as
required by the SCC in R v Van der Peet.72 Thus, the province’s court of appeal
denied their claim in a 2006 case.73 This means not only that Miawpukek
members do not have Aboriginal rights to hunt, trap, and fish in their traditional
territory, but that they will be unable to assert a right to be consulted when
large-scale development projects are under consideration.74
68.
69.
70.
71.

Kennedy, “Aboriginal Organizations,” supra note 47 at 17.
Miawpukek Band Order, SOR/89-533.
Plaice, supra note 46 at 73.
The Premier of Newfoundland once referred to the Mi’kmaq as immigrants. See Bartels &
Bartels, supra note 30 at 252, 256.
72. Supra note 2.
73. Drew v Newfoundland and Labrador (Minister of Government Services and Lands), 2006
NLCA 53, 260 Nfld & PEIR 1 [Drew].
74. Of course, one might say that this result arises because the Van der Peet test applies to all
Indigenous peoples in Canada and the Miawpukek have been unable to meet the test.
However, a substantive equality perspective overlooks the fact that the Van der Peet test is
designed to produce different outcomes without an adequate justification.
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C. THE INNU NATION

While the Innu were initially members of the NANL, they separated from it in
1975 in order to form the Naskapi-Montagnais Innu Association (later called
the Innu Nation), apparently because they were skeptical of the authenticity
of Mi’kmaq Indigenous identity and felt that the NANL was dominated by
Mi’kmaq.75 The Innu were perceived by outsiders as “real Indians” with “obvious
[I]ndigenous identity,” and they took political positions that were typically
associated with the Indigenous peoples, such as opposing resource extraction
activities and low-level military flights over their territory.76 They also joined the
Quebec provincial chapter of the AFN. Despite their lack of status as an Indian
band, they filed a land claim, which was accepted for purposes of negotiation by
the federal government in 1978.77 Like the Inuit, they also signed an impacts and
benefits agreement concerning the Voisey’s Bay mining project, which affected
their traditional lands. Thus, their lack of status did not prevent them from being
recognized by outsiders as Indigenous. Their close association and family ties with
recognized Innu bands in Quebec undoubtedly contributed to this recognition.
In parallel, the Innu Nation sought a form of political recognition that would
provide them with benefits similar to those afforded to First Nations elsewhere
in Canada, albeit outside the Indian Act. The failure of those discussions spurred
the filing of a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the
Commission).78 The choice of that forum is telling, as the Commission is rarely
asked to inquire into the political claims of the Indigenous peoples, largely
because matters arising under the Indian Act were, until recently, excluded from
its jurisdiction.79 As the Commission’s mandate is to implement the right to
equality, the Innu complaint was framed specifically in those terms:

75. Kennedy, “Aboriginal Organizations,” supra note 47 at 17.
76. Plaice, supra note 46 at 78-79; P Whitney Lackenbauer, Battle Grounds: The Canadian
Military and Aboriginal Lands (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) at 221-27, 246-47. The Innu
opposition gave rise to cases such as R v Ashini (1989), 79 Nfld & PEIR 318, 2 CNLR 119
(Prov Ct); Naskapi-Montagnais Innu Assoc v Canada (Minister of National Defence) (1990),
[1990] 3 FC 381, 35 FTR 161 [CA].
77. At the time of writing, an agreement-in-principle has been reached, but the final agreement
remains to be negotiated. See Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada,
Labrador Innu Land Claims Agreement-in-Principle, online: Government of Canada <http://
www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1331657507074/1331657630719>.
78. See McRae, supra note 45.
79. Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s 67, as repealed by An Act to amend the
Canada Human Rights Act, SC 2008, c 30.
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[T]he policies of the Canadian and Newfoundland governments regarding the delivery of most services to the Innu does not recognize them as an aboriginal people.
We are of the view that this constitutes discrimination, and an infringement of the
human rights and aboriginal rights of the Innu.80

The Innu complaint also outlined how this lack of recognition resulted in
differential benefits for the Innu, in the sense that it denied them such benefits
as the opportunity to assume local control of educational and social services and
to enter into negotiations towards self-government. To handle the complaint,
the Commission appointed a special investigator, Dean Don McRae of the
University of Ottawa, who produced a report that largely substantiated the Innu
complaint.81 Thus, the federal government’s failure “to acknowledge and assume
its constitutional responsibility for the Innu as aboriginal people” resulted in a
loss of “opportunity … to become registered under the Indian Act and to have
reserves created.” Moreover, the consequence of this denial was that “the Innu
[had] not received the same level and quality of services as [were] made available
to other aboriginal peoples in Canada.”82 It is noteworthy that in this process, the
investigator did not belabour the point that the Innu were Indigenous nor justify
his choice of First Nations under federal jurisdiction elsewhere in the country as
the proper comparator—as if these points were obvious.
The complaint and the report eventually induced the federal government to
offer recognition to the Innu as Indian Act bands. This recognition materialized
in 2002 when reserves were created at Sheshatshiu and Natuashish.83 As a result,
the Innu are now eligible for a tax exemption for income earned on reserve and for
the other benefits granted by the federal government to Indians individually (e.g.,
post-secondary tuition fees and non-insured health benefits84) and collectively (e.g.,
financing for band council operations or on-reserve schools). In addition, the Innu
bands can now benefit from the whole array of financial agreements extended to
other First Nations.

80. See McRae, supra note 45 (containing a reprint of a letter from Peter Penashue, President of
the Innu Nation, to Max Yalden of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, dated 16 July
1992).
81. See ibid.
82. Ibid at 73.
83. See Mushuau Innu First Nation Band Order, SOR/2002-415; Sheshatshiu Innu First Nation
Band Order, SOR/2002-414.
84. See Health Canada, Non-Insured Health Benefits for First Nations and Inuit, online: <http://
www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fniah-spnia/nihb-ssna/index-eng.php> (for additional information about the
non-insured health benefits program).
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D. THE ISLAND: QALIPU

In the early 1980s, the singling out of the Conne River community as the only
Newfoundland Mi’kmaq community to be transformed into an Indian band (the
Miawpukek) amounted to a clear differentiation between “authentic” Indians
and other Indigenous peoples, who were not deserving of federal recognition.
The implied message was that the communities represented by the FNI were
less authentic than the Miawpukek. Of course, this was rarely stated officially in
so many words. Perhaps one candid statement was made by a federal official in
1949, to the effect that the Mi’kmaq had become “merged with other citizens.”85
The idea that further genealogical research was needed, given as an explanation
of why only Conne River was recognized in the early 1980s,86 may be a more
polite way of describing the widespread disbelief in the authenticity of the FNI
members as an Indigenous group.
The federal government’s view until the early 2000s seems to have been that
the FNI membership should be considered “non-status Indians,” thus remaining
on this lower rung of the classification. And this became more evident when
the FNI joined CAP, the national association that represents non-status and
off-reserve Indigenous peoples. Yet the FNI was eventually successful in asserting
its right to Indian status through a combination of legal action, representation of
an “Indian” identity, and negotiation with the federal government.
When, in the late 1980s, the federal government announced that it would
not pursue the option of registering FNI members as Indians, the FNI responded
with a lawsuit in the Federal Court, in which it requested an order:
1) Declaring that the FNI Members are “Indians” within the meaning of [section]
91(24) of [t]he Constitution Act, 1867;
2) Declaring that the failure of Canada to provide the Plaintiffs with the benefits,
entitlements and rights provided to other recognized Indians and Indian bands,
including members of the Conne River (Miawpukek) Band, is discriminatory, and
contrary to [s]ection 15(1) of the Charter;
3) Declaring that the FNI Members are entitled to receive benefits from Canada
comparable to those provided by Canada to the Conne River (Miawpukek) Band
members under the Canada/Newfoundland/Native Peoples Conne River Agreement of 4 July 1981, and any successor agreement;

85. Tanner, supra note 26 at 243.
86. The Lyon Report, supra note 67 at 5-6.
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4) Directing the Governor-in-Council to recognize the member Bands of the Federation as bands under [t]he Indian Act; and
5) Awarding damages to the Federation for the breach by Canada of its fiduciary obligation to the member Bands of the Federation, which breach was Canada’s failure
to extend the benefits of [t]he Indian Act and the [Canada/Newfoundland/Native
Peoples Conne River Agreement] to them.87

As can be seen from this summary, the FNI lawsuit was based on the
concepts of fiduciary obligation and, more importantly, the right to equality.
Thus, the statement of claim88 indicated clearly to whom the FNI members
want to be compared. It asserted that the FNI membership was part of a single
“Mi’[k]maq Indian Nation” present throughout Atlantic Canada and in Eastern
Quebec.89 FNI members were said to be recognized by the Grand Council of
the Mi’kmaq Nation, an assertion that shows the importance of recognition by
other Indigenous groups in the assertion of Indigenous identity.90 The claim also
stated that there were “no significant racial, cultural or ethnographic differences”
between the FNI membership and Mi’kmaq in other provinces (who are
recognized as status Indians).91 More specifically, the statement of claim asserted
that there was no defensible distinction between the Miawpukek (Conne River)
Band and the FNI member bands:
[T]he Mi’[k]maq who live in or contiguous to the community of Conne River and
the Mi’[k]maq who live elsewhere on the Island of Newfoundland are descended
from common ancestors, and … there are no significant racial, cultural or ethnographic differences between and among them, except insofar as any two individuals
may have a different number of Indians among their ancestors. A Mi’[k]maq who
lives in Conne River ultimately shares the same Indian ancestry, either as to nature
or degree, as a Mi’[k]maq Indian who lives elsewhere on the Island.92

The statement of claim went on to highlight that the FNI member bands
had not been provided with any of the benefits afforded to Miawpukek following
its recognition as an Indian band.93 It then attempted to bolster its argument by
87. Federation of Newfoundland Indians v Canada, 2011 FC 683 at para 3, 390 FTR 294. This is
actually a judgment on a related procedural motion.
88. Ibid, T-129-89 (Statement of Claim of the Plaintiff) [on file with author].
89. Ibid at para 4.
90. Ibid at para 5.
91. Ibid at para 18.
92. Ibid at para 17.
93. Ibid at paras 27, 31-33.
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comparing the FNI membership to the Innu and Inuit of Labrador, who have
been provided benefits through the Canada-Newfoundland agreements.94
The FNI also filed a complaint with the Commission.95 As in the Innu case,
the Commission retained an external investigator, Professor Noel Lyon. Professor
Lyon’s report drew upon Dean McRae’s report concerning the Innu and stated that
its findings “applie[d] equally to the Mi[’]kmaq peoples of Newfoundland.”96 Yet,
contrary to the McRae report, the Lyon report acknowledged that the Indigenous
identity of the FNI members was being questioned and that this issue needed to
be addressed. Thus, in the introduction to his report, Professor Lyon noted that
it was unclear whether the FNI members would have been entitled to registration
had the Indian Act criteria been applied to them in 1949. He went on to lament
the effects of colonization on the assertion of Mi’kmaq identity:
With the passage of time the processes of intermarriage and assimilation with the
incoming European peoples makes it increasingly difficult to establish Mi[’]kmaq
identity. If the process of registration had been undertaken in 1949 the greater isolation of Mi[’]kmaq communities would have made the task easier. Only the tenacious commitment of these ten communities to the cultural heritage of their children has kept the lines that separate European and Mi[’]kmaq cultures from being
blurred beyond recognition.97

Professor Lyon then devoted an entire section of his report to a detailed
discussion of each Mi’kmaq community. While he acknowledged that many
Mi’kmaq had assimilated into mainstream society as a result of economic pressures
or government policy, he noted that “[w]hat both governments apparently did
not know is that there were pockets of Mi[’]kmaq people in Newfoundland who
had chosen to continue living according to their own cultural values and practices
and these groups formed living communities and remain so to this day.”98
Professor Lyon then went on to describe each Mi’kmaq band, paying particular
attention to cultural and educational projects, integration with non-Indigenous
communities, and broader socio-economic conditions. He also stressed the finite
number of members in each band and the strict membership criteria (similar to
those found in the Indian Act) in order to demonstrate that the FNI claim was
not “an open-ended claim made on behalf of a potentially unlimited number
94. Ibid at para 34.
95. See generally The Lyon Report, supra note 67. This report was commissioned as a result of the
FNI’s complaint to the Canadian Human Rights Commission.
96. Ibid at 2.
97. Ibid at 4.
98. Ibid at 9.
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of persons.”99 He even noted that the FNI, with federal funding, conducted a
detailed “institutional framework project” that outlined the steps already taken
by the FNI bands to organize voluntarily and suggested how this organization
could be further developed after federal recognition. Thus, his report emphasized
characteristics of the FNI members that are usually considered typical of
Indigenous communities and, more specifically, of First Nations governed by the
Indian Act.
Nevertheless, Professor Lyon’s report contained the seed of one striking
feature of the regime that would be put in place a decade later. He noted that
most of the communities other than Conne River (and perhaps Glenwood)
would not be suited for the creation of Indian Act reserves:
What struck me most forcefully at the end of my visits to FNI member communities was the inappropriateness of the Indian Act to their situations, with the possible
exception of Glenwood. That situation is a product of considerable intermarriage
with non-natives, going back over a very long time, and extensive integration with
non-native communities. It was the relative absence of these factors at Conne River
that made recognition under the Indian Act acceptable to the federal government.100

He thus suggested that the federal government recognize the FNI bands as
“legitimate Mi[’]kmaq communities,” but that the Indian Act model should not
be imposed on them. Rather, he invited the parties to enter into negotiations that
would lead to an original form of self-government, better suited to the circumstances of the Newfoundland Mi’kmaq. In other words, Canada’s Indigenous
peoples do not find themselves in identical circumstances and the same legal
regime may not be appropriate throughout the country. In particular, the reserve
system would not be appropriate to govern mixed communities, especially in the
urban context.
The negotiations that began shortly thereafter and intensified in 2003 picked
up this idea. In an agreement reached in late 2007, the federal government agreed
to create one “landless band” encompassing all Mi’kmaq individuals (except
Miawpukek members) on the island of Newfoundland.101 That band, called the
Qalipu Mi’kmaq First Nation band, would be governed by the Indian Act, but no
99. Ibid at 10.
100. Ibid at 21.
101. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Agreement for the Recognition of the Qalipu Mi’kmaq
Band , online: Qalipu <http://qalipu.ca/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/2011septAgreement-In-Principle.pdf> [“Qalipu Agreement”]. A supplemental agreement regarding
the registration process was entered into in June 2013. See Indian and Northern Affairs
Canada, Supplemental Agreement, online: Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
Canada <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1372160117898/1372160248148>.
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reserve would be created for it. That means that the Qalipu band will not exercise
any territorial jurisdiction, such as the powers provided for in section 81 of the
Indian Act.102 Rather, it will focus on the provision of services to its members. In
particular, Qalipu members will be eligible for the benefits afforded directly by
the federal government to status Indians irrespective of their residence on or off
a reserve, such as non-insured health benefits103 and post-secondary education
support. However, they will not be entitled to the rights that depend on residence
on a reserve, such as the tax exemption in section 87 of the Indian Act or certain
federal funding programs that are only available to First Nations possessing a
reserve (e.g., funding for band council operations or housing).
The agreement provides for a registration process whereby persons of
Canadian Indian ancestry who were members of a Newfoundland Mi’kmaq
community in 1949, or their descendants, may apply for enrolment.104 It also
provides a non-exclusive list of thirty-six such communities.105 While it was
expected that about 10,000 persons would enroll, a much greater number of
persons applied and the Qalipu band was officially created by order-in-council
on 22 September 2011 with 21,429 members.106 The initial registration process
is still in progress.
The process that led to the recognition of the Qalipu band shows how
similarity and difference are invoked in order to support claims based on the right
to equality. The initial actions of the federal government painted the FNI as lacking
the cultural and organizational features of genuine Indian bands or First Nations
and thereby doomed to remain on the lower rung of the official classification of
the Indigenous peoples. The FNI was able, however, to impose the idea that the
appropriate comparison was with status Indians, not with non-status individuals
elsewhere in the country. Thus, it was able to secure a place in the category that is
associated with the largest bundle of rights and benefits. However, this admission
among the status Indians came at a price: the reconfiguration of that category
through the new concept of the “landless band,”107 which carries lesser benefits
102. Such powers include the adoption of by-laws with respect to matters such as the residence of
band members, the construction of buildings, or fishing and hunting on the reserve. Supra
note 16.
103. Supra note 84.
104. Qalipu Agreement, supra note 101, s 4.1.
105. Ibid, s 1.16.
106. See Qalipu Mi’kmaq First Nation Band Order, SOR/2011-180; Order Amending the Qalipu
Mi’kmaq First Nation Band Order, SOR/2011-181.
107. We should note that the concept of the landless band was not truly new. However, up to that
date, a landless band was seen more as an anomaly than as a principled policy option. See e.g.
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than a band with a reserve.108 Moreover, the courts of the province have so far
denied that the Mi’kmaq enjoy Aboriginal rights, which makes for a further
differentiation with First Nations in other provinces or territories.109
Thus, what was viewed as an anomaly is now a new sub-category in the
official classification. Whether this development will serve as precedent for
groups elsewhere in the country (for instance, urban Indigenous groups) remains
to be seen.
E.

THE LABRADOR MÉTIS NATION/NUNATUKAVUT

The last Indigenous group to seek political and legal recognition in Newfoundland and Labrador is the Labrador Métis Nation (LMN), which was created in
1985. As mentioned earlier, groups of mixed ancestry formed in Labrador as a
result of the arrival of European men. However, those “Settler” or “Inuit-Métis”
communities were more visible in northern Labrador. Persons of mixed ancestry
in southern Labrador were subjected to greater assimilative pressures and their
identity was often hidden from outsiders.110 Moreover, when the “designated
communities” system was put in place after Confederation, only northern
communities were designated, reflecting and reinforcing the view that there were
no Indigenous peoples in southern Labrador. Yet, as one observer noted, the
latter “had just as much Inuit blood [as] and shared a similar way of life”111 with
their northern counterparts, which raises the question: Who is the appropriate
comparator group?
The LMN was formed in 1985 by persons of mixed ancestry in southern
Labrador who chose to reassert their Indigenous identity. As Kennedy notes,
for those people, “pride and interest in [their] roots [have] replaced stigma
and shame.”112 Initially, the group met with challenges to its indigeneity, and
accusations of opportunism.113 While one could assume that the group would
at most be classified in the “lowest” category of Indigenous peoples (non-status
Indians and Métis), it was actually successful in asserting its identity to the point

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Micmac Nation of Gespeg v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), 2007 FC 1036,
316 FTR 130, aff’d 2009 FCA 377, 402 NR 313.
This choice caused a split within the FNI, leading to the creation of a parallel organization
called K’takamkuk Mi’kmaq Alliance, whose legal action was dismissed mainly on procedural
grounds. See Davis v Canada (AG), 2008 NLCA 49, 279 Nfld & PEIR 1.
See Drew, supra note 73.
Kennedy, “Labrador Metis,” supra note 28 at 11-12.
Rompkey, supra note 46 at 155.
Kennedy, “Labrador Metis,” supra note 28 at 17.
Kennedy, “Aboriginal Organizations,” supra note 47 at 22.
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that it may possibly claim status as Inuit. Indeed, the LMN affiliated with the
Native Council of Canada, which became the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples,
the association that represents non-status and off-reserve Indigenous peoples.
Under that umbrella, it participated in certain federal programs—especially in
the field of labour market training—that were designed to apply to all Indigenous
peoples across the country, irrespective of status.114 Moreover, it recently changed
its name to Nunatukavut Community Council to underscore the Inuit roots of
its distinctive identity.115
The LMN was also successful in persuading the Royal Commission
on Aboriginal Peoples of its Indigenous identity. In its 1996 report, the
Commission stated:
Certainly, the Labrador Métis community exhibits the historical rootedness, social
cohesiveness and cultural self-consciousness that are essential to nationhood, and
they are developing a political organization that will allow them to engage in
effective nation-to-nation negotiation and to exercise self-government. While the
way of life of the Labrador Métis is very similar to that of Labrador Inuit and Innu,
the Métis culture is sufficiently distinct to mark them as a unique people, and in
our view they are likely to be accorded nation status under the recognition policy
we propose.116

This represented a powerful endorsement, as the Commission refused to give
an opinion on the situation of Métis groups other than the Métis Nation of
the West and the Métis of Labrador. The Commission’s explicit reference to the
Labrador Métis was also noted by the SCC in R v Powley, in which the LMN was
an intervener.117
However, the most interesting aspect of LMN’s identity claims is the group’s
application to the courts of the province for the recognition of the provincial
government’s duty to consult them before undertaking the construction of the
Trans-Labrador highway.118 Under the framework laid out by the SCC in Haida
Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests),119 an Indigenous group need
114. Kennedy, “Labrador Metis,” supra note 28 at 16.
115. “Labrador Métis Nation adopts new name,” CBC News (13 April 2010),
online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/
labrador-s-m%C3%A9tis-nation-adopts-new-name-1.927252>.
116. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report, Perspectives and Realities, vol 4 (Ottawa:
Canada Communications Group, 1996) at 193.
117. 2003 SCC 43 at para 10, [2003] 2 SCR 207.
118. See Labrador Métis Nation v Newfoundland and Labrador (Minister of Transportation &
Works), 2007 NLCA 75, 272 Nfld & PEIR 178 [Labrador Métis Nation].
119. 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 SCR 511.
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only bring prima facie evidence of an Aboriginal right in order to trigger the
government’s duty to consult. The province’s Court of Appeal decided to apply
this principle not only to the proof of the Aboriginal right, but also to the issue of
the Indigenous identity of groups who do not have Indian status. Thus, the LMN
asserted that it had Inuit Aboriginal rights or, in the alternative, Métis Aboriginal
rights. As the judge remarked:
While presenting their claim as beneficiaries of Inuit aboriginal rights, the [LMN]
say it is possible that, as a matter of law, their claim may eventually be founded upon
Métis rights. They submit, however, that they need not definitively take a position,
at this stage, as to whether they are Inuit or Métis, saying that this will ultimately
be determined by the courts, as a matter of law, once the essential facts have been
established. For now, say the respondents, in order to trigger a duty on the Crown to
consult with them, they need only establish a credible claim as aboriginal people.120

The LMN, likely as a result of this case, was included in the consultation
process dealing with the Lower Churchill hydroelectric dam project. While that
process gave rise to litigation, this time no one contested the Indigenous identity
of the LMN members.121
It remains to be seen whether the LMN will be successful in negotiating a
land claims agreement or other forms of official recognition. From my perspective,
the unsettled question is: Which comparison will be successful—are the LMN
members similar to the Inuit or to Métis? The answer will likely determine the
bundle of rights that they will secure.

IV. CONCLUSION
In 1949, applying equality in its formal conception was simple: No one in
Newfoundland was to be granted Indian status, and everyone would be treated
equally. More than sixty years later, substantive equality has proven to be a driving
force in the emergence of a mosaic of Indigenous groups. Paradoxically, however,
each group has secured different types of status, rights, and benefits.
In the process, groups seeking recognition claimed equal treatment by
drawing comparisons with already recognized groups elsewhere in the country
or within the province. They asserted “sameness in difference” rather than
attempting to show that their own difference from non-Indigenous society is
itself a ground for specific rights. This search for the appropriate comparator
120. Labrador Métis Nation, supra note 118 at para 8.
121. Nunatukavut Community Council v Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro-Electric Corporation
(Nalcor Energy) (2011), 307 Nfld & PEIR 306, 954 APR 306 (SCTD).
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also had profound implications for the political organization of the Indigenous
peoples of the province, as certain groups split from organizations that included
other groups that were considered of dubious Indigenous identity by mainstream
society. Although the SCC has downplayed the importance of comparator groups in
the application of the right to equality, the real-life experience studied above suggests
that comparison remains the most intuitive manner of seeking equal treatment.
Whether this outcome should be celebrated or decried is a difficult issue.
Advocates of equality will be uncomfortable with a situation where various
Indigenous groups end up with very different bundles of rights and benefits,
unless this disparity can be justified by the different needs and circumstances of
each.122 As mentioned in Part I, it is difficult to measure whether such justification
exists. Identity does not lend itself to easy comparisons; however, a critical observer
would note that whatever comparisons succeeded in Newfoundland and Labrador
were likely based on non-Indigenous perceptions about the authenticity of each
group’s Indigenous identity, as well as purely contingent factors such as a group’s
political bargaining position, timing, and sheer luck. And indeed, there does not
seem to be any obvious reason why northern and southern Settlers are treated
differently, or why Miawpukek has a reserve and Qalipu does not.
On the positive side, we may note that the official recognition of status and
the acquisition of at least certain rights is a valuable achievement for groups who
were previously dismissed as inauthentic. Qalipu is better off as a landless band
than unrecognized; and the prospect of granting only a limited bundle of rights
to groups who are currently without status might facilitate their recognition by
governments who are wary of the consequences for the public purse. As recent
SCC cases suggest that courts are mostly unwilling to scrutinize the disparities
between the status and rights of different Indigenous groups,123 political resolution
based on somewhat intuitive comparisons and differential rights may be the best
that unrecognized Indigenous groups can hope for in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, the current situation is unsatisfactory, especially when we
consider the number of Indigenous groups in other parts of Canada that are
claiming some form of recognition.124 The lack of a principled framework for the
resolution of these claims does not guarantee any form of consistent treatment
122. Indeed, the SCC indicates that distinctions may be compatible with the right to equality if
they “correspond” to the characteristics or circumstances of the claimant. See Law v Canada
(Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497 at paras 69-71, 170 DLR (4th)
1; Withler, supra note 13 at para 76.
123. Ardoch Algonquin First Nation & Allies v Ontario, 2000 SCC 37, [2000] 1 SCR 950; Alberta
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham, 2011 SCC 37, [2011] 2 SCR
670.
124. See e.g. Robert K Groves, “The Curious Instance of the Irregular Band: A Case Study of
Canada’s Missing Recognition Policy” (2007) 70 Sask L Rev 153.
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and leaves the rights of many groups to be decided by contingent factors. One
hopes that serious consideration will one day be given to the recommendation
issued by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples more than fifteen years
ago: to set up a specialized body tasked with assessing claims for recognition
against a common standard.125

125. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report, Restructuring the Relationship, vol 2
(Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1996) at 1001 (referring to recommendation
2.3.27). See also Paul LAH. Chartrand, “The ‘Race’ for Recognition: Toward a Policy of
Recognition of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada” in Louis A Knafla and Haijo Westra, eds,
Aboriginal Title and Indigenous Peoples: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2010) 125. It must be noted, however, that a similar system in the United States
has been the subject of criticism. See Mark E Miller, Forgotten Tribes: Unrecognized Indians
and the Federal Acknowledgement Process (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004); Renée
A Cramer, Cash, Color and Colonialism: The Politics of Tribal Acknowledgement (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 2005).

